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Abstract
This paper investigates the eect of foreign institutional investors on the sta-
bility of Chinese stock markets. Previous literature views this investor group as
destabilizing feedback traders. We use the abolition of ownership restrictions
on A shares as a natural experiment. There is strong evidence that foreign in-
stitutions have a stabilizing eect on Chinese stock markets and contribute to
market eciency. This nding is robust across exchanges, sample periods, size
quintiles and alternative model specications. By contrast, domestic investors
appear to engage in positive feedback trading. Our results have important
implications for market regulation.
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83-22846.1 Introduction
In rational models of stock price formation, investors base their decisions on fundamental
asset values. In contrast to this view, the last two decades have seen a rapidly growing
body of behavioral nance literature dealing with deviations from such rational behavior.
Among other things, some stock market participants may base their investment decisions
on past returns performance. Buying after prices have risen and selling in response to
price declines irrespective of fundamental values is usually called positive feedback trading
or momentum investing. The presence of positive feedback traders may destabilize stock
markets by driving prices away from fundamentals (De Long et al., 1990b) and impeding
arbitrage (De Long et al., 1990a; Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004).
In the case of Chinese stock markets, there is widespread popular belief that the tremen-
dous growth in recent years has attracted sentiment-driven investors. Eun and Huang
(2007) for instance cite the Wall Street Journal (August 22, 2001) comparing domestic
stock markets to "casinos, driven by fast money 
ows in and out of stocks with little re-
gard for their underlying value." A voluminous literature suggests that domestic Chinese
investors indeed engage in non-fundamental trading. Mei et al. (2005) analyze domestic
investors' trading activity, building on a model where heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale
constraints imply a positive relationship between a speculative stock price component and
trading volume. Their empirical tests conrm that uninformed trading by domestic in-
vestors has an impact on bubbles in A-share prices. This is in line with conclusions from
a recent paper by Fong (2008). He shows that A-share returns stochastically dominate
B-share returns, which leads to a rejection of risk-based explanations of the A-share pre-
mium.
Furthermore, a number of studies provide evidence of herding and trend-chasing by
domestic Chinese investors. Measures of return dispersion analyzed by Tan et al. (2008)
indicate herding in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets during the 1994 - 2003 period.
Investors in A-share markets appear to herd in response to positive market returns, as well
as high levels of trading volume and volatility. A recent contribution by Li et al. (2009)
comparing volume-based herding measures for institutional and individual investors trading
in the Shanghai A-share market arrives at similar conclusions. The authors also nd that
1institutions herd more than do private investors and that institutional (individual) herding
occurs primarily in small (large) stocks.
In related work studying the relationship between institutional transactions and volatil-
ity, Li and Wang (2008) argue that institutional investors have stabilized Chinese stock
markets. They show that institutional investors engage in herding but not in momen-
tum trading. However, their dataset only covers constituents of the Shanghai 180 index
and does not distinguish between transactions of foreign and domestic institutions. Kling
and Gao (2008) construct an index of Chinese institutional investors' sentiment. They
present evidence that domestic institutional investor sentiment is driven by previous mar-
ket returns, implying a positive feedback process. Finally, the study by Chen et al. (2005)
looking at individual brokerage accounts nds that account holders buy stocks in response
to short-term trends but care less about long-term past performance.
Summing up, there is a large body of evidence of sentiment-driven trading by Chinese
domestic investors in the A-share market. Such trading activity may cause asset prices
to deviate from their fundamental values, which leads to a distortion in investment and
consumption decisions and a potential misallocation of capital. It also increases the prob-
ability of stock price bubbles and subsequent crashes. In this sense, sentiment traders may
threaten nancial stability and put economic development at risk.
At the same time, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy requires domestic rms to
raise capital from abroad. Chinese regulators therefore had to open nancial markets to for-
eign institutional investors. Moreover, foreign institutions were thought to follow rational
long-term investment strategies dampening speculative activity (Walter and Howie, 2006).
In the public debate about nancial market liberalization, however, foreign institutional
investors are often alleged to exert a potentially destabilizing in
uence on emerging nan-
cial markets. Such concerns are partly fueled by empirical evidence that capital 
ows are
highly sensitive to past returns (Froot et al., 2001). In addition, a large body of literature
argues that foreign institutional investors in emerging markets tend to herd and engage
in positive feedback trading (Choe et al., 1999; Borensztein and Gelos, 2003; Kaminsky
et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2008). These ndings suggest that nancial liberalization may
have unintended consequences.
In this paper, we are interested in whether foreign investors indeed have a destabilizing
2eect on Chinese stock markets in terms of trend-chasing behavior. This issue is particu-
larly relevant in the case of a transition economy that has gradually opened its nancial
markets to foreign capital while trying to maintain nancial stability. The liberalization
of A-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen provides us with a unique opportunity to
shed light on the impact foreign institutional investors cast on the price formation pro-
cess. Originally, A-share ownership was restricted to domestic investors, notorious for
their sentiment-driven behavior. After the abolition of ownership restrictions in 2002,
Qualied Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) gained permission to enter the market.
We analyze trend-chasing behavior before and after this regulatory regime shift within the
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) heterogeneous agents framework. By comparing parame-
ter estimates across pre-liberalization and post-liberalization sample periods, we can draw
conclusions about destabilizing feedback trading by both investor groups.
The remainder of the text is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes stock markets
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, focusing on regulatory peculiarities. Section 3 lays out the
Sentana-Wadhwani heterogeneous agents model and describes our empirical approach. A
description of the dataset can be found in Section 4. Estimation results are discussed in
Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Chinese Stock Market Regulation and Investor Structure
Since their reopening on November 26, 1990 and April 11, 1991, respectively, the stock
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen have grown to become two of the largest stock ex-
changes in Southeast-Asia. At the end of 2007, total market capitalization had reached
about USD 3,920 billion in Shanghai and USD 827 billion for the smaller Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, rivaling the Tokyo Stock Exchange with a market capitalization of about USD
4,330 billion (World Federation of Exchanges, 2007).
Stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen were originally segmented into A and B shares
according to ownership restrictions. Initially, domestic citizens could only buy and sell A
shares, whereas foreign investors were only allowed to trade in B shares. Even though both
categories were identical in terms of ownership rights, market capitalization of the latter
segment remained low. As of December 2007, total market capitalization of A shares traded
in Shanghai (Shenzhen) was about 170 (40) times the total value of B shares. Moreover, B
3shares typically traded at a considerable discount vis- a-vis A shares (Fernald and Rogers,
2002).
The separation of ownership according to investor groups was later abolished in two
steps. First, in order to improve liquidity and market capitalization of B-share stocks, the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced on February 19, 2001 that
ownership restrictions on B shares would be lifted so that domestic investors could enter
the market. This measure came into eect on February 28, 2001. Second, on November 5,
2002, the CSRC decided to liberalize the A-share market to further encourage the in
ow
of foreign capital. However, market entrance is restricted to QFIIs, including nancial
institutions and insurance companies satisfying minimum requirements regarding assets
under management, paid-in capital and experience in trading (Chan and Yu (2003) for
details). In what follows, our analysis focuses on the liberalization of A-share markets,
which are more liquid and much larger in terms of market capitalization relative to B-
share markets.
Given the short period of time since the reopening of Chinese exchanges, domestic public
interest in stock markets is enormous. The large number of trading accounts in Shanghai
and Shenzhen reveals widespread participation. In contrast to mature markets, institu-
tional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies account for
a marginal fraction of total stock investment (Kling and Gao, 2008). Correspondingly,
less then 1% of A-share brokerage accounts in Shanghai and Shenzhen are owned by in-
stitutional investors (Walter and Howie, 2006). In contrast to this, the large number of
private trading accounts is often interpreted as a sign of extraordinarily active stock mar-
ket participation among domestic households (Li and Wang, 2008). However, Walter and
Howie (2006) argue that the largest fraction of total trading volume can be attributed
to privately managed (gray-market) investment funds sponsored by wealthy individuals,
notorious for their speculative activity. Comparing feedback trading before and after the
abolition of ownership restrictions thus allows us to draw conclusions about the impact
of foreign institutional trading on a market dominated by presumably sentiment-driven
domestic investors.
43 Feedback Trading and Stock Return Autocorrelation
Building on earlier work by Shiller (1984) and Cutler et al. (1991), Sentana and Wadhwani
(1992) develop a simple heterogeneous agents model of feedback trading where positive
(negative) feedback trading induces negative (positive) stock return autocorrelation. This
eect is increasing in the variance of the asset return as the demand (and thus share in trad-
ing volume) of risk-averse smart-money traders diminishes during periods of high volatility.
This approach has been widely used in the empirical literature on feedback trading. Ap-
plications to index returns include not only the US and the UK stock market (Sentana and
Wadhwani, 1992), but also mature European markets (Koutmos, 1997), Japan (Watanabe,
2002), as well as emerging markets in Asia (Koutmos and Saidi, 2001) and Eastern Europe
(Bohl and Siklos, 2008). Antoniou et al. (2005) use the model to analyze feedback trading
in stock markets before and after the introduction of futures markets, arguing that feedback
trading on spot markets is signicantly lower after the inception of futures trading.
In the framework of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), there are two types of investors.
The rst group are smart money traders who base their investment decision on risk and





where St is the fraction of stocks they hold, Et 1(Rt)    is the expected excess return of
stocks over the risk-free rate, and t measures the risk of stock holding. In what follows,
we dene the raw return on stocks as Rt = Pt=Pt 1  1, where Pt is the index value at the
end of period t. In a mean-variance framework, the time-varying risk measure will be an
increasing function of the conditional variance of stock returns, t = (2
t) with 0(2
t) > 0.
Without loss of generality, we can follow Koutmos (1997) and assume that risk is linearly
related to volatility, (2
t) =   2
t. As Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) point out, market
equilibrium in a model with investors of this type alone yields the familiar capital asset
pricing model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).
The second group of investors are feedback traders who trade stocks in response to
5previous returns. Their demand for stocks is given by
Ft = Rt 1; (2)
where Rt 1 denotes the return in the previous period. This demand function captures
both types of feedback trading. Positive (negative) feedback traders buy (sell) stocks when
previous returns are positive, which implies  > 0 ( < 0).
In equilibrium, markets clear so that demand from both groups sums up to 1
St + Ft = 1: (3)
Plugging in both demand functions and assuming rational expectations, Et 1[Rt] = Rt+"t,
yields an empirical model for returns given by
Rt =  + 
2
t    
2
t Rt 1 + "t: (4)
Notice that in the absence of feedback traders, the stock return in period t is only aected
by the rst two terms, the level of the risk-free rate and the riskiness of the investment.
This view is consistent with the CAPM. However, if the stock market is populated by both
smart money and feedback traders, the contemporaneous stock return also depends on
its own lagged value. The model predicts negative or positive autocorrelation of returns,
depending on the sign of the parameter , i.e. whether feedback trading is of the positive
or negative kind.
Moreover, the model implies that the amount of serial return correlation crucially de-
pends on the level of conditional stock return volatility 2
t. Sentana and Wadhwani (1992)
argue that the in
uence of feedback trading on returns is stronger, the higher the con-
ditional variance of returns. Intuitively, rational investors reduce their demand during
periods of high volatility, whereas feedback traders are only concerned about past returns,
ignoring such risks. Therefore, the market share of sentiment-driven investors and thus the
in
uence of feedback trading on stock returns rises during periods of high volatility. The
interaction between the demand of feedback traders and stock return volatility is re
ected
in the multiplicative term in Equation 4.
6When testing the implications of the model, we modify Equation 4 along the lines
of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) and assume that autocorrelation depends linearly on
volatility. For our baseline model, the mean equation for log returns (rt = ln(Rt) =
ln(Pt)   ln(Pt 1)) is given by
rt =  + 
2
t + (0 + 1
2
t) rt 1 + "t (5a)
=  + 
2
t + 0 rt 1 + 1 
2
t rt 1 + "t (5b)
Notice that a negative (positive) point estimate of 1 implies that the marginal eect of
conditional volatility on stock return autocorrelation is negative (positive). In the Sentana-
Wadhwani framework, this is consistent with the notion of positive (negative) feedback
trading, corresponding to a positive (negative) parameter  in the demand function of the
sentiment-driven investor group. The parameter 0 captures serial correlation induced for
instance by nonsynchronous trading (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), transaction costs (Mech,
1993) or time-varying expected returns (Conrad and Kaul, 1988).
Finally, we use a GARCH(1,1) approach to modeling conditional volatility of log returns

2





Our analysis focuses on feedback trading by domestic (mainly individual) versus foreign
institutional investors, that is a shift in the parameter 1. In order to formally test the
hypothesis that this change is statistically signicant, we follow Antoniou et al. (2005) and
estimate the following variant of Equation 5a
rt =  + 
2
t + [0;1 (1   Dt) + 0;2 Dt + 1;1 (1   Dt) 
2
t + 1;2 Dt 
2
t] rt 1 + "t; (7)
where Dt denotes a dummy variable that takes on the value of one after the liberalization
date of the A-share market. We then test the hypotheses H0;1 : 0;1 = 0;2 and H0;2 : 1;1 =
1;2.
In addition to the baseline model given by Equations 5b and 6, we consider two modi-
cations. First, following Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), we investigate whether positive
7feedback trading is more intense during market downturns. The modied mean equation
for the asymmetric model is given by
rt =  + 
2
t + (0 + 1
2
t) rt 1 + 2 jrt 1j + "t (8)
which implies that the composite coecient on lagged returns is
0 + 1
2
t + 2 if rt 1  0 (9)
0 + 1
2
t   2 if rt 1 < 0 (10)
A signicantly positive (negative) point estimate of 2 indicates that return autocorrelation
is more negative (positive) during bear (bull) markets, which in the context of our model
can be interpreted as evidence of more (less) positive feedback trading. As discussed by
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), this view is consistent with margin traders being forced
to liquidate their positions as well as time-varying risk aversion in response to negative
changes in total wealth.
Second, we consider a modied model where serial correlation is an exponential function
of conditional volatility as suggested by LeBaron (1992). The mean equation for this
exponential model is








t= )] rt 1 + "t; (11)
where   is the unconditional variance of log returns, which in empirical applications is
replaced by its sample analogue. Our heterogeneous agents model predicts that, if feedback
trading is of the positive kind, the parameter estimate of 0
1 should carry a positive sign,
as opposed to the expected negative value for 1 in the baseline model. Watanabe (2002)
estimates this variant of the Shiller-Sentana-Wadhwani model for Japanese stock index
returns and nds a better empirical t than for the baseline model.
84 Data
Daily observations for the value-weighted Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share indices are col-
lected from Thomson Financial Datastream. Assuming continuous compounding, daily re-
turns are computed as the dierence in logs between closing values, rt = ln(Pt) ln(Pt 1).
We choose the sample period to be symmetric around the liberalization date. It covers the
period between January 2, 1997 and December 28, 2007. This also excludes observations
from the early days of both stock exchanges, which suer from poor data quality due to in-
frequent trading (Fong, 2008). We divide our total sample into subsamples before and after
ownership liberalization. The rst subsample covers the period before liberalization from
January 2, 1997 to November 29, 2002. The second subperiod begins on December 2, 2002,
which is the rst trading day after the liberalization had come into eect. For robustness
checks, we also collect data for Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share market indices. To retain
the symmetry of the sample period around the liberalization date, which is February 28,
2001 in the case of B shares, we adjust the sample period to January 2, 1996 - December
29, 2006 for this exercise.
We expect the A-share market entrance of QFIIs during the post-liberalization period
to aect the return dynamics of large and small stocks dierently as empirical evidence
suggests that institutional trend-chasing and herding mainly occurs in stocks with low
market capitalization (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Li et al., 2009). Therefore, we construct
size portfolios for the A-share segment of each market. We obtain daily data on close
prices and market capitalization of A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Our
portfolio formation procedure is as follows: On the last trading day in a given year j   1,
we rank stocks traded for example in the Shanghai A-share segment according to their
market capitalization on that particular day. Based on this ranking, we assign all stocks
to quintiles for the following year j. If trading in a certain stock is discontinued during
year j, the composition of the respective size portfolio is rebalanced at the beginning of
year j +1. Finally, we calculate value and equally-weighted returns for each portfolio on a
given day t.
Summary statistics for index and value-weighted portfolio returns (not shown) suggest
that all time series exhibit moderate negative skewness and considerable excess kurtosis.
9Comparing sample means across the ve portfolios, we nd that daily log returns are
highest (lowest) for stocks in the low (high) market capitalization quintile.
5 Empirical Results
We estimate the empirical models outlined in Section 3 by quasi maximum likelihood as-
suming normally distributed errors. The parameter estimates for all structural coecients
in Equations 5b and 6 can be determined directly using constrained maximization meth-
ods implemented under RATS 6.2. Since summary statistics discussed in Section 4 suggest
that all stock return time series exhibit excess kurtosis, we correct standard errors for po-
tential non-normality as suggested by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Both Akaike and
Schwarz information criteria favor the parsimonious GARCH(1,1) specication over higher
order alternatives.
Table 1 summarizes our baseline estimation results for Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share
indices. We start our discussion by looking at parameter estimates for the volatility equa-
tion. Both volatility clustering (0) and GARCH eects (1) are highly signicant. The
stationarity condition 0 +1 < 1 is fullled. The intercept ! is statistically dierent from
zero at conventional levels of signicance in all cases.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Turning to the mean equation, we nd that point estimates for  are signicant in 4
out of 6 cases. This implies that the level of returns on A shares is aected by conditional
volatility as a CAPM-type model would suggest. Estimates are only insignicant for the
post-liberalization period. However, this nding is not uncommon in empirical tests of the
Shiller-Sentana-Wadhwani model (Koutmos, 1997; Bohl and Siklos, 2008) or of GARCH-in-
Mean models of stock returns in general (Nelson, 1991). For both markets and all sample
periods, the intercept of the mean equation is negative and signicantly dierent from zero
in most cases. In our model, this parameter carries the interpretation of the daily risk-free
interest rate. For various reasons, it appears plausible that the risk-free rate perceived by
domestic investors may be exceptionally low or even negative in the case of China. Fernald
10and Rogers (2002) highlight the fact that the Chinese government has traditionally set
interest rates on bank deposits and saving bonds close to zero or even negative in real
terms, which amounts to an eective taxation of capital. They argue that such a lack
of investment alternatives implies that a CAPM-type representative investor may require
very low minimum returns.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in whether foreign institutions entering the
A-share market after liberalization have sided with feedback traders. In fact, our results
seem to suggest the opposite. For both Shanghai and Shenzhen, we obtain for the pre-
liberalization period a point estimate of 1 that is negative and dierent from zero at the
5% level of signicance, which is consistent with the predictions of the feedback trader
model. This implies that a considerable fraction of domestic investors, to whom ownership
of A shares was restricted, were buying (selling) stocks when prices rose (fell) regardless of
fundamental values. Such evidence of positive feedback trading is consistent with previous
literature. First, it is reminiscent of speculative motives of Chinese A-share investors
documented by Mei et al. (2005) and Fong (2008). Second, looking at brokerage account
data, Chen et al. (2005) show that domestic private investors are more concerned about
short-term past performance than long-term past performance. Their results are in line
with our evidence of very short-term day-to-day feedback trading by domestic individuals.
Reestimating the model for the post-liberalization sample period allows us to evaluate
the eect of the market entrance of foreign institutional investors on feedback trading.
Interestingly, 1 is insignicant for the later subsample. This result is consistent with the
view that foreign investors may have acted as smart-money traders reducing the market
dominance of trend-chasing domestic speculators. Their market entrance has thus damp-
ened the eect of feedback trading on stock index returns and contributed to the eciency
of Chinese A-share markets.
We further investigate the trend chasing behavior of both investor groups along 5 lines.
First, we test whether the change in the parameters of interest is statistically signicant
following the procedure of Antoniou et al. (2005). Estimation results for the modied
baseline model including a post-liberalization dummy (Equations 6 and 7) are reported in
Table 2. In line with the results for subsamples in Table 1, we nd that the parameter
estimate of 1 is negative and signicant during the period when only domestic investors
11could trade in A shares and insignicant afterward. In addition, we can reject the hypoth-
esis of equal coecients at the 1% level of signicance. This corroborates our conclusion
that most Chinese individual investors have engaged in feedback trading during the earlier
sample period whereas foreign investors seem to have sided with rational investors who
base their decision on risk-return considerations.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Second, using the date when A-share ownership restrictions where ocially abolished
to divide the sample may appear somewhat arbitrary. The presumed structural change in
the return generating process may have occurred at a later point as institutional traders
entered the market during the post-liberalization period. Therefore, we explore alternative
sample splits by means of standard structural break detection methods in the spirit of
earlier literature (Chiang, 1988). Specically, we compute the cumulative sum (CUSUM)
of recursive standardized residuals, which serves as a qualitative indicator of structural
change in our model (Harvey, 1981). As can be seen from Figure 1, the CUSUM gradually
increases after the market entrance of QFIIs. This is in line with the notion of an increasing
fraction of institutional trading causing a break in the structural parameters of our model.
We identify peaks in CUSUM and the liberalization date as potential switching points and
employ Chow tests to formally test their signicance. Table 3 reports the results along
with 1 parameter estimates for the two subsamples. Two ndings bear mention. For all
hypothesized break points, the change in the parameters of the model is signicant with
the largest test statistic obtained for the liberalization date in December 2002. Moreover,
point estimates of 1 are signicantly negative in the earlier and insignicant in the later
periods. This conrms our previous results regarding the stabilizing in
uence of foreign
institutions.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 about here]
Third, it is conceivable that the observed shift in the structural parameters of the model
is not due to the in
uence of institutional trading but other factors aecting Chinese stock
12markets. Potential in
uences include macroeconomic conditions, learning on behalf of do-
mestic investors and changes in regulation or policy regimes. In order to make our empirical
results robust against such criticism, we compare our A-share results to additional tests on
B-share returns. As explained in Section 2, B-share markets were originally restricted to
foreign, mainly institutional investors but liberalized in 2001. If our previous conclusion is
valid, i.e. foreign institutional investors have not engaged in feedback trading and stabi-
lized A-share markets, there should be no evidence of feedback trading in B shares during
the pre-liberalization period. By the same token, the market entrance of domestic traders
may lead to signicant feedback trading eects after the liberalization.
We estimate the Sentana-Wadhwani model on Shanghai and Shenzhen B-share returns
for the 1996 - 2006 period, in order to maintain the symmetry of subsamples around the
liberalization date. Parameter estimates are summarized in Table 4. Previous literature
suggests that domestic investors have illegally traded in B-shares before the abolition of
ownership restrictions (Fong, 2008; Ma and McCauley, 2002). This implies that a signicant
feedback trading parameter for this sample period may be due to the in
uence of domestic
traders circumventing ownership restrictions. Estimation results for the pre-liberalization
period should therefore be interpreted with caution. As a matter of fact, we obtain a pre-
liberalization point estimate of 1 that is signicant at the 5% level for Shenzhen, which
is the smaller market in terms of market capitalization and trading volume. However,
the parameter estimate is highly insignicant in the case of Shanghai. Thus, as expected,
we nd only weak if any evidence of feedback trading before the liberalization date. By
contrast, there is strong evidence of positive feedback trading after the market entrance
of domestic traders. In line with our initial hypothesis, the estimate of 1 is statistically
dierent from zero at the 1% level of signicance for both markets. Also, the coecient is
considerable larger in magnitude compared to the earlier period. Summing up, estimation
results for B-share returns support our main conclusions.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Fourth, we estimate the Sentana-Wadhwani model for value-weighted returns on indi-
vidual size portfolios, ranging from 1 (low market capitalization) to 5 (high market cap-
13italization). Tables 5 and 6 report empirical results for Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share
markets. The analysis largely conrms our previous results. There is strong evidence of
positive feedback trading by domestic investors during the pre-liberalization period. In
the case of Shanghai (Shenzhen), the coecient 1 is signicantly negative for 5 (4) out
of 5 portfolios. Interestingly, the eect appears stronger for smaller rms with the largest
coecient found for portfolio 1. Domestic investors chasing short-term trends seem to
trade most actively in small cap stocks. The picture diers dramatically for the sample
period after the market entrance of foreign institutional investors. With the exception of
Shanghai large cap stocks, we do not nd evidence of feedback trading after the market
entrance of foreign investors. Even for the remaining portfolio, the relevant coecient is
only statistically dierent from zero at the 10% level of signicance. In sum, feedback
trading occurs primarily in stocks with low market capitalization and can be attributed
to domestic, mostly private investors. Foreign institutions, by contrast, do not appear to
engage in trend-chasing investment strategies in neither small nor large cap stocks.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Finally, we investigate whether feedback trading occurs primarily during market declines.
We estimate the asymmetric model given by Equations 6 and 8 for the total sample period.
In the case of Shanghai (Shenzhen), the point estimate for the additional parameter 2 (not
shown) is positive and signicant at the 5% (1%) level. As detailed in Section 3, we can
infer that serial correlation in stock returns is more negative (positive) after a price decrease
(increase). The in
uence of positive feedback trading appears even stronger during bear
markets.
The same picture emerges when looking at a plot that compares conditional return
autocorrelation implied by the baseline model (calculated as 
impl
t = ^ 0 + ^ 1 2
t) to the
value of the A-share index in Figure 2. Implied serial correlation is most negative during
market downturns, as for instance during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998. Sen-
tana and Wadhwani (1992) suggest that such a relationship can be explained by models
where risk-aversion declines strongly with wealth, making portfolio insurance strategies
rational. Alternatively, they conjecture that margin traders, who are forced to sell their
14positions after prices have fallen, contribute to positive feedback trading during such pe-
riods. Although Chinese authorities have only recently ocially legalized margin trading
(Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2008), there is evidence that domestic investors have en-
gaged in leveraged stock trading in the past (Girardin and Liu, 2005). This makes the
margin trading interpretation of our results quite plausible.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
To further verify the robustness of our empirical results, we conduct additional tests
where the empirical approach is modied in several respects. In additional estimations of
the baseline model, we explore the eect of extending the sample period to 1994 - 2007.
Empirical results (not shown) conrm our main conclusions on feedback trading by foreign
institutional and domestic investors. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, serial correlation
of stock returns can be modeled as an exponential function of conditional volatility. Es-
timation results, which are available from the authors on request, are similar across both
exchanges. For the pre-liberalization period, the eect of the exponential transformation of
volatility on return autocorrelation is signicantly positive (^ 0
1 > 0) whereas the point esti-
mate for 0
0 is negative and signicant at the 5% level. At the same time, the corresponding
parameter estimates for the post-liberalization period are not statistically dierent from 0
at conventional levels of signicance. This result lends further support to our conclusion
that QFIIs entering the Chinese A-share market after December 1, 2002 have reduced the
proportion of feedback traders in this segment and thus stabilized the market.
6 Conclusions
The emerging stock markets of China are among the fastest growing in the world. A large
body of literature provides evidence that sentiment-driven domestic investors play an im-
portant role in these markets. In this paper, we consider a natural experiment, namely the
ownership liberalization of domestic A-share markets in December 2002. This regulatory
regime shift allows us to investigate the impact of foreign institutional investors on the price
formation process. Our analysis focuses on the relative propensity of domestic individual
15versus foreign institutional investors to follow trend-chasing trading strategies. Previous
research has mainly documented destabilizing feedback trading by foreign institutions in
emerging markets (Choe et al., 1999; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2008). Our em-
pirical results suggest the opposite. We nd strong evidence of positive feedback trading
before liberalization whereas such eects disappear thereafter. The observed parameter
shift is statistically signicant and robust to variations in the empirical model.
The conclusions are twofold. First, we can infer that domestic investors driving the
market in the earlier period followed trend-chasing trading strategies. This empirical result
lends support to anecdotal evidence comparing Chinese stock markets to casinos. More
importantly, it is in line with previous empirical work suggesting speculative investment
behavior of Chinese individual traders (Mei et al., 2005; Fong, 2008) as well as a strong
relationship between private investors' stock purchases and short-term past performance
(Chen et al., 2005). Moreover, our ndings conrm previous evidence that individual
investors engage in positive feedback trading (Bange, 2000). We also nd that trend-chasing
behavior is more dominant during market declines. This is consistent with the notion of
intensied positive feedback trading by margin traders who are forced to liquidate their
position after market declines. Unfortunately, because margin trading has been ocially
legalized only recently, we do not have data necessary to further investigate this issue.
Second, our ndings have regulatory implications. Sentiment-driven investor behavior
is of concern for security market regulators since positive feedback trading together with
rational investors' bandwagoning can destabilize nancial markets (De Long et al., 1990b).
Contrary to conventional wisdom and our initial hypothesis, foreign institutional investors
entering the market after November 2002 did not engage in feedback trading. By contrast,
the in
uence of trend-chasing on A-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen has diminished
after the market entrance of foreign investors. We can therefore conclude that market
liberalization has reduced the probability of speculative bubbles in stock prices and thus
contributed to a sustainable development of Chinese stock markets.
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21Table 2: Tests for Changes in Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates Hypothesis Tests
0;1 0;2 1;1 1;2 H0;1 : 0;1 = 0;2 H0;2 : 1;1 = 1;2
Shanghai A-Share
0:046 0:035  0:012  0:011  31:375 46:006
(0:141) (0:274) (0:006) (0:161) (0:000) (0:000)
Shenzhen A-Share
0:050 0:092  0:008  0:012  82:870 54:370
(0:139 (0:005) (0:090) (0:118) (0:000) (0:000)
Note: The table reports coecient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992)
GARCH(1,1) Model as well as t-statistics for hypotheses regarding individual pairs of parameters. The estimated
mean equation is
rt =  + 2
t + 0;1 (1   Dt) rt 1 + 0;2 Dt rt 1 + 1;1 (1   Dt) 2
t rt 1 + 1;2 Dt 2
t rt 1 + "t:
The variance equation is given by
2
t = ! + 0"2
t 1 + 12
t 1
where rt denotes the log return (multiplied by 100) on the Shanghai and alternatively Shenzhen A-share index. Dt is
a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 after December 1, 2002. P-values are based on robust Bollerslev and
Wooldridge (1992) standard errors. *,** ,*** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The sample period is January 2, 1997 - December 28, 2007.




December 2, 2002  0:008  0:001 8:981
(0:019) (0:966) (0:000)
November 18, 2003  0:009  0:019 4:341
(0:019) (0:232) (0:000)
June 3, 2005  0:010  0:018 3:375
(0:020) (0:205) (0:001)
Shenzhen
December 2, 2002  0:008 0:007 20:394
(0:012) (0:717) (0:000)
November 18, 2003  0:007  0:011 13:397
(0:081) (0:504) (0:000)
December 5, 2005  0:007  0:008 13:735
(0:044) (0:607) (0:000)
Note: The table reports results for Chow tests under the null of constant parameters as well as coecient estimates
and p-values (in parentheses) for alternative break points. P-values for 1 estimates are based on robust Bollerslev and
Wooldridge (1992) standard errors. *,** ,*** denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The total sample period is January 2, 1997 - December 28, 2007. Hypthesized breakpoints: December 2, 2002 (lib-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Figure 1: Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals
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Note: The gure graphs the cumulative sum of standardized residuals from the recursive estimation of the
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) GARCH(1,1) model, starting from an initial January 3, 1994 - January 2, 1997
sample period.
27Figure 2: A-Share Indices and Implied Conditional Return Autocorrelation









































  Note: The gure graphs the value of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share Index (black) as well as return
autocorrelation implied by our heterogeneous agents model (gray), computed as 
impl
t = ^ 0 + ^ 1 2
t .
28